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Abstract 
In this paper, using a sample of Italian bus and coach operators, we investigate the presence and the 
magnitude of scale and scope economies in the provision of passenger transport services. The 
estimates of a Composite Cost Function econometric model highlight the presence of global scope 
and scale economies only for multi-service operators (providing urban, intercity and for-hire bus 
and coach transport services) with output levels lower than the ones characterising the ‘average’ 
firm. This indicates that relatively small, specialised companies would benefit from cost reductions 
by evolving into multi-service firms providing urban, intercity and coach renting services. For 
operators of a bigger size, scope economies can be still exploited by linking urban and intercity 
services or by linking intercity services and coach renting, whereas the couple urban service-coach 
renting is associated with strong diseconomies of scope. Our results can help policymakers (that 
must define the boundaries of the service area to be tendered) and firms (that, as a result of the 
ongoing liberalization process, have increased opportunities to invest in regulated and non-regulated 
passenger transport activities) to make informed decisions. 
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1.   Introduction 
The passenger transport industry has a pervasive socio-economic and 
environmental impact and is a significant contributor to the national and regional 
economies of most developed and developing countries. According to the European 
Commission, the Italian bus and coach industry (which includes all urban and 
suburban land transport modes, such as motor bus, tramway, streetcar, trolley bus, 
and metro) was employing in year 2011 171,200 workers, with a turnover of about 
11 EUR billion. This amounts to 8% of the turnover of the entire passenger and 
freight transport sector, and to 0.7% of Italy’s GDP (European Commission, 2014). 
The operation of public transport services has a significant impact on the budget of 
territorial bodies, since in most cases the revenues from end users tickets and 
subscriptions are not sufficient to recover the cost of providing the service.  In 
recent years, in order to introduce more efficiency, enhance productivity and reduce 
huge deficits, many countries have put in place reforms in which the institutional 
reorganization of the industry is combined with the design of new regulatory 
measures that foresee specific incentives to increase efficiency. For example, the 
Italian Government, faced with a situation in which bus operators were on average 
benefiting from subsidies as high as to cover 71% of their operating costs, 
introduced in the late nineties a radical reform which modified the institutional 
organization of the industry. In particular, the programming of the services and the 
management of the subsidies were shifted from the national to the regional level, 
and firms were required to sign formal agreements with local governments (service 
contracts) to clearly define the rules that the providers of the service must obey and 
to address important issues such as reimbursement and risk-sharing schemes. The 
above measures, together with the reliance on competitive tendering for the 
allotment of service concessions and the introduction of incentive mechanisms in 
the allocation of subsidies (e.g., through a subsidy cap), were supposed to improve 
efficiency and to enhance competition. New laws and decrees were introduced in 
the 2000s, and a Transport Regulation Authority was established in 2011. 1 
                                                          
1 The Authority, that became fully operational in January 2014, defines the schemes for tendering 
and the contents of the service contracts, sets the criteria to fix tariffs, contributes to define public 
sector obligations, sets minimum quality standards, defines minimum rights and entitlements that 
may be claimed by passengers vis-à-vis transport operators.   
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However, a huge resistance movement to the reforms of local public services leaded 
to the setup of an abrogative referendum in 2011. Twenty-seven million citizens 
voted against the obligation of organizing call for tenders for the management of 
the services2, a result that involved a significant slowing down of the liberalization 
process.3  
An effective reform of the industry cannot be implemented without a detailed 
analysis of the cost structure of bus and coach operators. In fact, the study of the 
economic and technological characteristics is a fundamental step, since it allows 
the identification of the proper configuration of the network and provides guidance 
if one wants to implement adequate regulatory interventions (if evidence is found 
in favor of natural monopoly) or to open the market to competition (if the empirical 
results show that natural monopoly conditions do not hold). Moreover, the 
definition of the optimal dimension of the local transport network represents a 
necessary starting point for an efficiency-oriented policymaker who is planning and 
designing the provision of the service (i.e., extension of the service areas, 
frequencies of buses, choice of the number of bus lines, etc.). 
As stated by Karlaftis and McCarthy (2002) “Characteristics of the underlying 
production technology of firms in regulated industries have attracted considerable 
interest in the literature due to the vast array of valuable information provided by 
such analyses. Policy makers and governmental agencies may be interested in the 
underlying production technology in order to set pricing policies. A finding of 
diseconomies of scale may imply that, for example, a city can have different parts 
of its system operated by separated companies at a lower unit cost of output” (p.1-
2). 
The fact that operators are often multi-service firms, which operate in regulated 
markets such as urban and intercity transport and in non-regulated markets such as 
long distance express coach and hired coach services, is another interesting aspect 
that deserves careful investigation. As theoretically shown by Calzolari and Scarpa 
                                                          
2 Article 23-bis of decree-law no. 112/2008, which was abrogated as a result of the popular vote, 
outlined the public tender as a preferential model to manage local public services. In-house provision 
was admitted only as an exception, after having verified the existence of particular socio-economic 
conditions that made it impossible to resort to the market. 
3 The main concern of referendum organizers was to fight against the privatization process in the 
water sector. However, the abrogative effect was widespread to all local public services, including 
passenger transport.  
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(2016), if multiservice firms are exploiting scope economies, it is desirable from a 
social welfare point of view to let them run integrated productions activities in 
regulated and unregulated sectors.  
Constant changes in the economic, social and environmental systems also require 
adaptation in the transportation structure. To that respect, coach services can 
represent an essential complement of regular transit systems (Talley, 2007). They 
can contribute to the development of a capillary network, in that they can be easily 
interconnected with other modes of transport. Unlike scheduled transport services 
purely geared to predetermined destinations on fixed and authorized routes4, hired 
coach travel is typically characterized by non-scheduled times and non-fixed routes. 
Given these characteristics, this service is mainly addressed to occasional users, as 
it occurs, for example, in the tourism sector. Conversely, long distance coach 
transport plays a crucial role in connecting the most dispersed part of the countries 
to major destinations. As a result of the liberalization process undergoing in most 
countries (European Commission, 2009), express long distance coach transport is 
growing exponentially so as to directly compete with railways and airlines 
services.5  
Despite its increasing importance, coach renting activities received only little 
attention in the literature. In order to fill this gap, this paper analyses the cost 
function of a sample of Italian transit firms which are providers, in combination or 
as specialised units, of urban, intercity and for-hire transport services in the years 
2008 to 2012. Given the presence in the sample of specialised, two-output and 
three-output firms, we can investigate the presence of economies of scope for multi-
service firms. From a methodological point of view, we differ from the standard 
literature, which uses the Translog Cost Function or the Generalised (Box-Cox) 
Translog Cost Function, and we test the advantage of using the Composite Cost 
Function model introduced by Pulley and Braunstein (1992), which appears to be 
well suited to analyse the cost properties of multi-product firms.  
                                                          
4 The European Commission (2009) identifies as “special regular” coach services such as school and 
employee transport services, which operate on defined routes and at defined times, but provide for 
the carriage of specific types of passengers to the exclusion of others. 
5 See, for example, Beria et al. (2014) for Italy, Chen and Soo (2009), for Taiwan, Aarhaug and 
Fearnley (2016), for Norway, and Walter et al. (2011), for Germany. 
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The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 shortly reviews the 
relevant empirical literature. Section 3 develops the Composite Cost Function 
model upon which is based the subsequent econometric analysis. Section 4 
illustrates the main characteristics of our sample and shows some descriptive 
statistics concerning the variables included in the cost model. Section 5 presents the 
results of our estimates and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
Early studies on the analysis of costs in the transportation literature were mainly 
focused on the effects of diversification among different transit modes (such as 
motor-bus, rapid-rail, streetcar, trolley-bus, etc.) within the same urban area. 
Colburn and Talley (1992), for example, by analysing four modes of transport in 
urban systems find evidence of the presence of limited cost complementarities. 
Viton (1993), by investigating the processes of aggregation between different 
suppliers, show that cost savings resulting from mergers depend on the transport 
modes of the companies as well as on the number of firms involved in  the merger. 
More recently, Farsi et al. (2007), exploring multi-modal transport systems, show 
that economies of scale and scope exist, and are therefore in favour of integrated 
multi-mode operations as opposed to unbundling. 
In order to estimate scale and scope economies, which are key structural elements 
to define the technology behind an industry, the most popular method is to use a 
multi-output specification of the cost function. While scale economies are due to 
decreasing marginal costs and to the sharing of fixed costs, scope economies can be 
due to the use of similar equipment such are wires, overhead line, similar skills such 
as driving, management and network maintenance, and synergies in advertising, 
scheduling and ticketing. 
As for scale economies, Gagnepain et al. (2011) report that a significant number of 
empirical studies are in line with a U-shaped average cost curve, exhibiting 
increasing returns to scale for smaller operators and decreasing return beyond a 
certain output level. As an example, Cowie and Asenova (1999) estimate that small 
companies (with a bus fleet of less than 200 vehicles) experience some economies 
of scale. Looking at a set of medium and large Italian municipalities, Cambini et al. 
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(2007) find evidence of economies of scale in most cases, suggesting that operators 
should operate on the entire system of urban network, without fragmentation of the 
service. They also argue that mergers between operators of neighbouring urban 
centres or between suppliers of urban and intercity transit services would be 
desirable in order to reduce operating costs.  
In the literature, there are relatively few studies tackling the issue of the horizontal 
integration between urban and intercity services. Fraquelli et al. (2004) investigates 
the existence of scope economies by using in the estimation a set of dummy 
variables to distinguish between specialized companies (in urban or intercity 
service) and integrated operators, and find evidence of lower costs for integrated 
bus transport firms. Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2010) model the total cost function for 
multi-service Local Public Transport (LPT) companies. The results of the 
estimations highlight the presence of very mild scope economies (around 2%) 
between urban and intercity services. However, by decomposing the effects related 
to the sharing of fixed costs from the ones stemming from cost complementarities 
(i.e. relative to the variable costs component), they find that horizontally integrated 
firms can save up to 6.3% of fixed costs. The extent of scope economies tends to 
decrease as the firm size increases, and modest scale economies (of the order of 
1.040) are also observed for the median firm. 
More recently, Ottoz and Di Giacomo (2012), analysing the LPT system of a 
specific Italian region (Piedmont), provide empirical evidence of the impact on 
costs of different diversification strategies. In particular, they observe that 
diversification depends on ownership type. While privately-owned firms generally 
choose to diversify into transit-related activities offered in competitive markets 
(such as, for instance, rental bus services), publicly-owned bus companies are more 
likely to diversify in regulated businesses (such as electricity, water and sewerage, 
car parking management). Due to unavailability of data on supply-oriented output 
quantities (like travelled kilometres), they used revenue as proxy of the output of 
each activity. The authors present estimates from two cost functions, one with two 
outputs (local public transit, which includes both urban and intercity services, and 
a sum of transport-related and non-transport activities), and the other with three 
outputs (local public transit, transport-related and non-transport activities). The 
results show the presence of scope economies for the median firm which range 
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between 16% and 30%, depending on the cost function specification as well as on 
the number of outputs. Lower global scope economies are found for publicly-owned 
firms, and, more in general, for large operators. Finally, pairwise scope economies 
are found (16%) between core business transport services (urban plus intercity) and 
transport-related services.  
To the best of our knowledge, no existing empirical research has estimated multi-
product cost functions including hired coach, urban and intercity passenger services 
as three separate outputs.6 This has been due also to severe limitations of available 
data.7 The empirical analysis which is closest to the spirit of our study is indeed the 
above cited paper by Ottoz and Di Giacomo (2012), who estimate a cost function 
accounting for subsidized transport services (the sum of the vehicle-kilometres 
covered by buses in both urban and intercity areas), non-subsidized transport 
services (the vehicle-kilometres covered by hired coaches) and non-transport 
services (the share of total revenues stemming from activities such as parking, waste 
disposal and treatment, gas and electricity distribution, etc.).  
3. The econometric cost function model 
The availability of data on costs, outputs and inputs for Italian firms providing 
urban, intercity and for-hire bus transport allows us to undertake a detailed study of 
the cost function in order to detect the presence of aggregate and product-specific 
economies of scale and scope. According to the well-known Generalized Translog 
(GT) Specification (Caves et al., 1980), the cost function is given by:8  
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where C is the long-run cost of production, yi refers to outputs (in our three-output 
case i, j = U, I, H ), wr indicates factor prices (in our three-input case r, l = L, K, 
                                                          
6 For a more comprehensive review of the empirical literature dealing with the urban public transport 
sector, see Daraio et al. (2016). 
7 As stated by the European Commission: “Very little national statistics are available on long 
distance bus and coach services and in terms of both regulation and statistics, there is no distinction 
made between extra-urban services and local buses” (European Commission, 2009, p. 5). 
8 For convenience, we omit the subscript referring to individual observations. 
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MS), and the superscripts in parentheses   represent Box-Cox transformations  of 
outputs.9  
The associated input cost-share equations are obtained by applying the 
Shephard’s Lemma to expression [1]10 
 
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Setting   0 in [1] and [2] yields the nested Standard Translog (ST) Specification, 
with all output terms in the cost function and in the corresponding cost-share equations 
assuming the usual logarithmic ( yln ) form.11 
For small values of , the estimated GT function is a close approximation to the ST 
functional form. Due to its log-additive output structure, the latter suffers from the well-
known inability to evaluate cost behavior when any output is zero. This has been proved 
to yield unreasonable and/or very unstable values of the estimates for scope economies 
and product-specific scale economies (e.g., Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; Piacenza and 
Vannoni, 2004; Bottasso et al., 2011).  
To overcome the above problems, Pulley and Braunstein (1992) proposed as an 
alternative functional form for multi-product technologies the Generalized Composite 
(PBG) Specification.  
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where C is the long-run cost of production, yi and wr refer to outputs and factor prices, 
respectively, and the superscripts in parentheses ,  and  represent Box-Cox 
transformations.  
                                                          
9  We indicate the Box-Cox (1964) transformation for a generic output iy  as
)(
iy , where
 /)1()(  ii yy  for 0 and ii yy ln
)(   for   0. Such a transformation allows to take 
into consideration observations for which the output iy is equal to zero. 
10 Cost-shares are computed as Sr = (XrPr)/C. By Shephard’s Lemma Xr = C/wr, where Xr is the 
input demand for the rth input, so that Sr =  lnC/  lnwr. 
11 In this case, zero values for any of the three outputs are replaced with 0.001. 
 10  
By applying the Shephard’s Lemma, one can easily obtain the associated input cost-
share equations: 
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Equation [3] embraces several of the most commonly used cost functions. The 
Generalized Translog (GT) and the Standard Translog (ST) models can be easily 
obtained by imposing the restrictions  = 0 and  = 1 (and  = 0 for the ST model). The 
Composite Specification (PBC) is a nested model in which  = 1 and  = 0, while the 
Separable Quadratic (SQ) functional form requires the further restriction ir = 0 for all 
i and r. The PBG and PBC specifications originate from the combination of the log-
quadratic input price structure of the ST and GT specifications with a quadratic 
structure for multiple outputs. This makes the model particularly suitable for the 
empirical cost analysis. The quadratic output structure is appropriate to model cost 
behavior in the range of zero output levels and gives the PB specifications an 
advantage over the ST and GT forms as far as the measurement of both economies of 
scope and product-specific economies of scale are concerned. In addition, the log-
quadratic input price structure can be easily constrained to be linearly homogeneous.12 
In this paper, we estimate the system [3]-[4] and carry out LR tests in order to select 
the specification best fitting observed data. We then obtain estimates of aggregate and 
output-specific scale and scope economies for our sample of LPT firms. Finally, by 
fully exploiting the informational content of our specification, we investigate the 
presence of scope economies for couples of services. 
Given the regularity conditions ensuring duality, the PB specifications do not impose a 
priori restrictions on the characteristics of the below technology. A more parsimonious 
and less general form is the Separable Quadratic (SQ) Specification, in which all terms 
ir are set equal to 0. The SQ function allows estimating the costs in the range of zero 
                                                          
12 To be consistent with cost minimization, [1] and [3] must satisfy symmetry (ij = ji and rl = lr for 
all couples i, j and r, l) as well as the following properties: a) non-negative fitted costs; b) non-negative 
fitted marginal costs with respect to outputs; c) homogeneity of degree one of the cost function in input 
prices (rr = 1 and lrl = 0 for all r, rir = 0 and rμri = 0 for all i); d) non-decreasing fitted costs in 
input prices; e) concavity of the cost function in input prices.  
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outputs, but has the disadvantage of imposing strong separability between outputs and 
inputs.  
3.1.   Measures of scale and scope economies 
Assume the multi-product cost function to be represented by  ),;( wyCC  where 
),,( HIU yyyy   and ),,( MSwwww KL . Local measures of global and product-specific 
scale and scope economies can be easily defined. Global or aggregate scale economies 
are computed via 

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where ii ywyCMC  /);(  is the marginal cost with respect to the ith output and 
iCy ywyCi ln/);(ln   is the cost elasticity of the ith output. 
The above measure describes the behavior of costs as all outputs increase by strictly 
the same proportion. However, since product mixes rarely remain constant as output 
changes, additional dimensions of scale behavior can be measured by product-specific 
scale economies indicators. These latter show how costs change as the output of one or 
two products changes with the quantities of other products held constant. Product-
specific economies of scale for the couple of products (i, j; ij) are defined by 
);( ][
);(
wyC
IC
MCyMCy
IC
wySCALE
ji CyCy
ij
jjii
ij
ij
 


                           [6] 
where );();( wyCwyCIC ijij   represents the incremental cost of the couple (i, j), 
and );( wyC ij  is the cost of producing all the other products different from i and j.  
The degree of scale economies specific to the product i are finally  
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where );();( wyCwyCIC ii   is the incremental cost relating to the ith product and 
);( wyC i  is the cost of producing all outputs except the ith one. Returns to scale 
defined by expressions [5], [6] and [7] are said to be increasing, constant or decreasing 
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as SCALET, SCALEij and SCALEi are greater than, equal to, or less than unity, 
respectively.  
Scope economies (diseconomies) are reflected into cost savings (cost disadvantages) 
associated with the joint production of many outputs. The measure of global or 
aggregate scope economies for our three-output case can be computed via 
 
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with positive values of SCOPET representing global economies of scope and 
negative values global diseconomies of scope. 
Product-specific economies of scope for output i are  
 
);(
);();();(
);(
wyC
wyCwyCwyC
wySCOPE iii

                                          [9] 
where C(yi; w) is the cost of producing only output i, and SCOPEi indicates a cost 
disadvantage (if greater than zero), or a cost advantage (if lower than zero) in the 
“stand-alone” production of output i.13 
Finally, it is also possible to assess the degree of economies of scope for couples of 
outputs under the assumption that the production of the remaining output is zero. 
Formally, scope economies for the couple of products (i, j; ij) are defined by 
 
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with C(yij; w) denoting the cost of producing the outputs i and j alone. 
The following relationship nicely highlights the links between aggregate and product 
specific scope economies: 
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13 In our three outputs case, the measure of product-specific economies of scope for the couple (i, j) 
is identical to the one for the remaining good k (SCk = SC-ij): 
SCOPEk = SCOPE-ij = SCOPEij =
);(
)];();();([
wyC
wyCwyCwyC ijij  
. 
 13  
4. Data description 
We obtained data on costs, output quantities and input prices by integrating the 
information available in the annual reports of each company with additional 
information drawn from questionnaires sent to managers.14 Long-run total cost (C) 
is the sum of fuel and other raw materials and services, labor and capital costs of 
the firm. All monetary values are expressed in 2010 constant prices, using as a 
deflator the general production price index. The three output categories are: urban 
transit (yU), intercity transit (yI) and for-hire transit (yH). As shown by Daraio et al. 
(2016), an array of demand-oriented measures, such as passenger-trips or 
passenger-kilometers, and supply-oriented measures, such as vehicle-kilometers, 
seat-kilometers or total-seat kilometers have been used in the literature. Our 
measure, vehicle-kilometers, is the most popular in the empirical cost analysis.15 
As discussed in sections 1 and 2, it is difficult to disentangle bus and coach 
transport, on the one hand, and intercity and long distance services, on the other 
hand. In our data, coach services are partially included in the variables yI and yH. 
Rather than clearly distinguishing between coach and bus transport, we aim at 
separating occasional services and special regular services (which are both included 
in yH) from regular services (included in yU and yI).  
Productive factors are labor, capital, materials and services. The price of labor in 
each utility (wL) is given by the ratio of total salary expenses to the number of 
employees. Capital price (wK) is obtained by dividing the sum of amortization costs, 
interest payments and costs for the use of third party goods by the total number of 
vehicles.16 Finally, the price of material and services (wMS) is the cost of fuel and 
                                                          
14  Data were gathered in teamwork with the two main Italian category associations: ANAV 
(Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori) and ASSTRA (Associazione Trasporti). 
15 Daraio et al. (2016), selected and reviewed 31 studies focusing on the cost function estimation of 
local public transport companies. As they reported in Table 6 (page 11), vehicles-kilometer was used 
as an output measure in 57% of the cases. Seat-kilometers and passenger kilometers were two other 
popular measures (27% and 17% of cases, respectively). 
16 In a previous version of this paper, we used operating cost as a left hand side variable. In practice, 
total cost was not including interest payments and wK was simply computed by dividing the 
amortization costs by the total number of vehicles. As suggested by a referee, by including interest 
payments and leasing charges, we end up with a more meaningful and better measure of the true 
cost of capital. We thank the referee for having raised this issue.    
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other raw materials (spare parts, tyres) and services (including maintenance) per 
liter of fuel consumption.17 Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. 
The dataset is an unbalanced panel of 47 firms observed during the years 2008-
2012, for a total of 147 observations. 30 observations refer to specialized firms, 
while 9 observations refer to fully integrated firms. The vast majority is however 
represented by firms performing a couple of services, in particular intercity and for-
hire services, or intercity and urban. As shown in Table 1, the average firm is 
endowed with a bus fleet of around 150 buses and employs around 300 workers.18  
5.   Estimation and empirical results 
All the specifications of the multi-product cost function are estimated jointly with 
their associated input cost-share equations. Because the three share equations sum 
to unity, to avoid singularity of the covariance matrix the capital share equation (SK) 
was deleted and only the labor equation (SL) and the materials and services equation 
(SMS) were included in the systems.
19 Before the estimation, all variables were 
standardized on their respective sample means, and regional and time dummies 
were included in all regressions.20 Assuming the error terms in the above models 
are normally distributed, the concentrated log-likelihood for the estimated cost 
function and related labor-share equation and material-share equation can be 
respectively computed via 






 

T
t
tC
T
t
tC
T
TT
CL
1
2
1
ˆ
1
ln
2
)]2ln(1[
2
lnln                             [12] 
                                                          
17 In a set of non-reported regressions, we have excluded services from the computation of the 
residual input, in order end-up with a set of “distance related” cost components. The results of 
estimations, which are very similar to the one reported in the next section, are available upon request. 
We are indebted to an anonymous referee for having raised this issue. 
18 The figures reported in Table 1, with the exception of yU, yI and yH, refer to all 147 observations, 
so that, as an example, 24.373 million euros refers to the yearly total cost of a hypothetical average 
firm, and so on. 
19 We have tested models with four inputs, where fuel (which accounts, on average, for 18.5% of 
total costs) was considered as a separate input. Results are very similar and are available upon 
request. 
20 Parameter estimates were obtained via a non-linear GLS estimation (NLSUR), which is the non-
linear counterpart of the Zellner’s iterated seemingly unrelated regression technique. This procedure 
ensures estimated coefficients to be invariant with respect to the omitted share equation (Zellner, 
1962). 
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where t is the single observation (t = 1, …, 147 ), Cˆ , Lˆ and Fˆ are the estimated 
residuals of the two regressions, and (-  t ln Ct) is the logarithm of the Jacobian of 
the transformation of the dependent variable from tC  to tCln  ( 


T
t
tJJ
1
with tJ
= | ttC C / | = 1/Ct). Similarly, the concentrated system log-likelihood is defined 
by: 
  ln))2ln(1(2
2
lnln ),( 
T
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                                           [13] 
Where J is the Jacobian of the transformation of ),,(
tMStLt
SSC  into 
),,,(ln
tMStLt
SSC  and  is the (33) matrix of residual sum of squares and cross 
products for the system, where the pqth element of  (pq) is equal to
tq
T
t
tpT
 ˆˆ
1
1


and p, q = C, SL, SMS 
The summary results of the NLSUR estimations for the ST, GT, SQ, and PB models 
are presented in Table 2. In the first row the value of the Box-Cox parameter () for 
the GT specification is positive (0.1987) and significantly different from zero (t-
ratio = 5.482). The small value of  suggests that, being a close approximation to 
the standard translog form, the GT model would suffer from the same drawbacks 
of the ST specification when used to estimate cost properties of multi-product firms. 
The estimates of the three “box-cox” parameters are all significantly different from 
zero, and suggest that restricting them to be equal to some specific values (one or 
zero, according to the four nested specifications PBC, SQ, GT and ST) may result 
in an imprecise estimation of technological parameters.   
The following five rows present the estimates of cost elasticities with respect to 
outputs and factor prices for the ‘average’ firm.21  
                                                          
21 The average firm (the point of normalization) corresponds to a hypothetical firm operating at an 
average level of production for each output and facing average values of the input price variables.  
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While the four estimated cost function models seem to perform similarly with 
respect to input-price elasticities (which are close to the observed input cost shares 
reported in Table 1), the estimates for the output elasticities show a greater 
variability, with SQ and PB models according more weight to the urban service. 
The R2 for the cost function and for the cost-share equations are very similar, except 
for the SQ specification. The lower ability of the SQ specification to fit the observed 
factor-shares is not surprising given that it assumes a strong separability between 
inputs and outputs. McElroy’s (1977) R  2 (R* 2) can be used as a measure of the 
goodness of fit for the NLSUR system. The results suggest that the fit is slightly 
lower for the ST (R* 
2 = 0.97) and GT (R* 
2 = 0.96) functional forms.  
Since the PBC, SQ, GT and ST models are all nested into the PBG  specification, 
standard likelihood ratio (LR) hypothesis testing based on system log-likelihoods 
can be applied to see which model adjusts better observed data. The LR statistics 
lead to reject the ST and GT specifications (critical 
2
)3(01.0   = 11.34; computed 
2
)3(  
= 215.42 for the ST model and critical 
2
)2(01.0   = 9.21; computed 
2
)2(  = 225.34 for 
the GT model). Similarly, the null hypothesis that PBG and SQ models are equally 
close to the true data generating process is rejected in favor of the PBG specification 
(critical 
2
)2(01.0   = 9.21; computed 
2
)2(  = 144.63). However, the restricted 
composite model PBC cannot be rejected (critical 
2
)2(01.0   = 9.21; computed 
2
)2(  = 
7.72). 
The estimates of scale economies for the average firm in the sample are similar 
across models (except for the GT model where the estimate is larger), and suggest 
that the average firm is exhibiting constant returns to scale (all figures, except for 
the SQ model, are not statistically different from one). This finding is consistent 
with Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2011), with Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2010), considering 
that the average firm in their sample has a fleet size of 50 vehicles (i.e. one third of 
the size of our sampled firms), as well as with the results of a study of the UK 
Competition Commission, that concluded that small-scale bus operators are not 
likely to be significantly disadvantaged by higher costs relative to larger-scale 
operators (Competition Commission, 2011).  
The relative advantages of the composite specification can be best appreciated by 
comparing the measures of global economies of scope.  In the ST (GT) specification 
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the average firm exhibits scope diseconomies of the order of -27% (-21%), while 
the PBG, PBC and SQ models all point towards the absence of economies of scope. 
This is in line with expectations, since the ST cost model, as well as the GT 
specification for small values of the Box-Cox parameter (in this case  = 0.1987), 
often provide unreasonable and/or very unstable estimates when outputs are set near 
to zero. 22  
The preference for the composite specification on the base of statistical fit and as a 
result of LR based statistics is thus further strengthened by the better ability of 
quadratic models in measuring global scope economies. In the remaining of the 
paper we will then focus on the PBG functional form in carrying out the empirical 
tests concerning scope and scale economies.23 
5.1.   Global and product specific economies of scale and scope 
Table 3 reports the estimates for global scale and scope economies evaluated at the 
output sample means, y* = (y*U, y*I, y*H), and at ray expansions and contractions of 
y*. More precisely, we consider the following output scaling: λy* = (λy*U, λy*I, 
λy*H), with outputs ranging from one fourth (λ=0.25) to four times (λ=4) the values 
observed for the ‘average’ firm. The results show the presence of aggregate 
economies of scale (SCT= 1.15f for λ=0.25) and economies of scope (SCOPET= 
0.29 for λ=0.25 and 0.13 for λ=0.5) for small firms, while for firms larger than the 
average, economies of scope are absent and decreasing returns to scale appear.  
By looking more deeply into the contribution of each product or couples of products 
in determining the above global scope and scale economies results, it emerges that 
scope economies are mostly driven by the presence of the intercity bus service, 
since both SCOPEI, SCOPECUI and SCOPECHI are positive and significant at most 
different size levels.  
                                                          
22 In a similar vein, the ST and GT models provide estimates for product specific scale and scope 
economies which are very implausible. 
23 The estimated PBG cost function also satisfies each of the output and price regularity conditions 
at 90 percent of the sample data points. More precisely, fitted costs are always non-negative and 
non-decreasing in input prices (fitted factor-shares are positive at each observation). Concavity of 
the cost function in input prices is satisfied everywhere in the sample (the Hessian matrix based on 
the fitted factor-shares is negative semi-definite). Fitted marginal costs with respect to each output 
are non-negative for 138 observations out of 147. 
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Up to λ=2 (i.e. when the bus fleet is lower than 300 buses and the number of workers 
is less than 600), a firm which is active in urban transport or in coach renting (or 
both), can benefit from cost synergies if it adds the intercity bus service.  As far as 
the size of the firm increases, these synergies remain only for the pairwise 
combination of urban and intercity service. Conversely, the negative values of 
SCOPEcHU, SCOPEU and SCOPEH suggest that for large firms it is better to run 
hire coach services and urban transport as separate activities.  
Borrowing from the sports betting terminology, we can conclude that triples (i.e. 
the joint provision of urban, intercity and for-hire services) do not seem to be good 
strategies in terms of costs, whereas pair-wise combinations (doubles) of urban and 
intercity services, on the one hand, or intercity and coach hire services, on the other 
hand, can represent sound diversification strategies. The ‘double’ linking urban 
services and coach hire, on the contrary, does not appear to be a wise ‘bet’. 
 
 5.2.   Discussion and policy implications 
According to our estimates, the average firm in our sample exhibits constant 
aggregate returns to scale and is characterized by the absence of global scope 
economies. For smaller firms, the presence of scope economies for the intercity 
service leads to both aggregate scope economies and aggregate scale economies. 
For firms larger than the average, the presence of output specific decreasing returns 
to scale24 counterbalances the effect of output specific scope economies, so that the 
final result is the absence of global scope economies (see equation 11) and the 
presence of decreasing aggregate returns to scale.  
Therefore, our results suggest that firms for which the core business is urban 
transport can benefit from diversifying into intercity services, while firms 
specialized in intercity services can exploit scope economies by diversifying into 
coach renting services, but a diversification strategy which involves all three 
activities is not beneficial (except for very small operators).  
A number of interesting policy implications emerge. Within the context of local 
transit systems, especially in the urban case, the possibility to increase outputs 
                                                          
24 The results for product specific economies of scale (SCALEi) point to the presence of constant 
returns to scale up to λ=1, and decreasing returns to scale for operators of larger sizes. However, the 
estimates for couples of products (SCALEij) show that returns to scale are constant at all firm sizes, 
except for the couple yU-yH, where they are decreasing for big operators. 
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might be rather limited unless firms diversify towards other similar activities. The 
diversification towards intercity and also for-hire services should be considered as 
a valid option in small environments, when the size of the urban area does not allow 
public transport firms to reach a minimum dimension. On the other hand, the 
demand for mobility in large metropolitan areas creates the conditions for having 
separate operators providing urban, intercity or for-hire services. As to for-hire 
services, their peculiar characteristic due to non-scheduled times and non-fixed 
routes do not favor too much their integration with other transit services. 
Nonetheless, for small companies, the integration might still be a viable solution, 
especially when the more competitive environment faced in rental coach sector 
makes it difficult to grow in the core activity. Intercity services represent the activity 
that can more easily be coupled with either urban or for-hire services. 
There is some anecdotal evidence of firms’ strategies that follow paths which are 
consistent with our findings. For example, in the city of Turin, the urban activities 
of ATM and the suburban activities of SATTI were merged in a new entity named 
GTT, which is consolidating its presence in the urban and intercity services and is 
at the same time divesting the subsidiaries involved in coach renting. To take 
another example, Arriva (a multinational UK transport company, acquired by 
Deutsche Bahn in 2010) started an aggressive acquisition campaign of intercity 
operators in northern Italy (among which SADEM in Piedmont, SAB in Lombardy, 
SADVA in Aosta Valley), operators which provide also coach renting services. 
Policy makers in charge of organizing competitive tendering must choose the 
proper configuration of the network to be put to tender. One option is to fragment 
the network in sub-basins, and open separate tenders for different quarters of a 
town, another option is relying on single tenders for the entire municipal area, 
eventually including also suburban areas and intercity connections. While the 
fragmentation of the service area and the unbundling of urban and intercity services 
lowers the barriers to market entry and may stimulate the participation of 
specialized and small companies as bidders, they may lead to higher bidding prices 
(i.e. higher costs), since the synergies in the joint production can no longer be 
exploited. Our findings, on the one hand, point towards the presence of substantial 
scope economies between urban and intercity services, and are therefore in support 
of integrated urban-intercity tenders. However, since intercity transport could be 
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conveniently coupled also with hiring services, the hypothesis of tendering specific 
intercity routes should not be excluded a priori, in light of a scenario where intercity 
routes are contended competitively by both urban transit firms and for-hire coach 
companies. The latter would instead be discouraged to participate in tendering that 
involves both urban and intercity services (because of scope diseconomies between 
urban and for-hire outputs). This scenario might be evaluated carefully especially 
in large metropolitan areas, where the creation of sub-basins might be a viable 
solution, given that scale economies tend to exhaust at relatively low output levels. 
Of course, since our paper focuses exclusively on supply side factors, a cautionary 
note is necessary. In fact, the policy maker should take into consideration also 
demand-side factors such as population size and structure, network effects, 
ticketing strategies of operators, and so on. 
  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, using a sample of Italian bus and coach companies observed for the 
years 2008-2012, we explore the presence of scale and scope economies in the 
passenger transport sector. Using a Composite Cost Function econometric model 
(Pulley and Braunstein, 1992), which allows to disentangle potential synergies 
emerging when firms provide different combinations of three types of transit 
services (urban, intercity and for-hire) we find that small multi-service firms may 
benefit from cost reductions with respect to specialized operators. As the size of the 
firm increases, the cost savings remain only for the intercity bus service, while both 
output specific and aggregate decreasing returns to scale emerge. 
Therefore, we find that for operators of a bigger size, scope economies can be still 
exploited by linking urban and intercity services or by linking intercity services and 
coach renting. Conversely, the joint provision of urban service and coach renting is 
associated with strong diseconomies of scope.  
Our results can help policymakers (that must choose the boundaries of the service 
area to be tendered) and firms (that, as a result of the ongoing liberalization process, 
have increased opportunity to invest in regulated and non-regulated passenger 
transport activities) to make informed decisions. 
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The presence of scope economies between urban and intercity transport are in favor 
of bundling in a single tender the two services (especially in situations in which 
there are large metropolitan areas surrounded by satellite or edge cities), while the 
synergies between intercity transport and coach renting can be fruitfully exploited 
by firms that are seeking to expand their activities in the passenger transport 
industry. In some circumstances (for example in regions characterized by different 
relatively small urban centers), a viable solution could also be that of establishing 
separate tender procedures for the intercity service, so as to enable the participation 
of both urban operators and coach renting companies as bidders. This will leave the 
market free to undertake the desired aggregations. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
Operating Cost (106 Euros) 
Total Cost (106 Euros) 
24.373 
24.567 
60.159 
60.499 
0.275 
0.277 
6.489 
6.562 
499.328 
502.110 
Output and Input      
yU  - Urban (106 kilometers)  11.202 11.900 2.190 8.300 56,740 
yI  -  Intercity (106 kilometers)   3.403 4.857 0.090 1.545 22,060 
yH  - For-hire (106 kilometers)   
 
Workers 
Bus and Coaches 
0.852 
 
 
305.463 
148.041 
0.753 
 
 
705.107 
255.563 
0.010 
 
 
2 
7 
0.610 
 
 
91 
57 
3,500 
 
 
5,499 
1,832 
Input prices      
wK - Price of capital (103 Euros) 18.595 11.195 2.550 17.184 61.988 
wMS - Price of materials and services, 
including fuel (Euros per liter) 
wF - Price of fuel (Euros per liter) 
2.893 
 
1.458 
0.923 
 
0.491 
1.570 
 
0.765 
2.630 
 
1.326 
5.960 
 
3.247 
wL - Price of labor (103 Euros) 38.942 6.221 23.824 38.708 50.455 
Cost shares      
SK - Capital share  0.185 0.083 0.046 0.163 0.460 
SMS - Materials and services share 
-  of which SF - Fuel share  
0.355 
0.185 
0.103 
0.053 
0.159 
0.087 
0.343 
0.186 
0.592 
0.322 
SL - Labor share  0.460 0.118 0.202 0.476 0.696 
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Table 2. NLSUR estimation: Standard Translog (ST), Generalized Translog (GT), Separable Quadratic (SQ), and Composite (PB) cost function models a  
 PBG  MODEL PBC  MODEL SQ MODEL GT  MODEL ST  MODEL 
Box Cox Parameters  
 
   
 0.9939*** (0.1665)                    1 1 0.1987***  (0.0362) 0 
 -0.1506*** (0.0354) 0 0 1 1 
 0.5562*** (0.0364) 
 
0.6289 ***   (0.0472) 0.4972*** (0.0565) 0 0 
Output and factor price elasticities b      
UCy
  0.6232***  (0.0377) 0.6187***    (0.0167)   0.6204***  (0.0136) 0.3383***  (0.0758) 0.3811***  (0.0820) 
ICy
  0.40426*** (0.0751)   0.3141***    (0.0248) 0.3282***  (0.0216)   0.3253***  (0.1126)     0.5420*** (0.0969) 
HCy
  0.0627        (0.0927)   0.1222***    (0.0292) 0.1245***    (0.0293)   0.2457        (0.1698)     0.1278      (0.1434) 
SL 0.5386***  (0.0216)   0.5364***    (0.0155) 0.4501***  (0.0088) 0.5054***  (0.0398) 0.5174***  (0.0302) 
SMS 0.2993***  (0.0246)   0.3036***    (0.0187) 0.3598***  (0.0087) 0.3425***  (0.0368) 0.3388***  (0.0336) 
 
Global scale and scope economies b  
SCALET 
 
SCOPET 
 
 
 
 
0.9173       (0.0662) 
 
-0.0201       (0.0792) 
 
 
 
  0.9478           (0.0326) 
 
0.0294           (0.0393) 
 
 
 
0.9318***     (0.0199) 
 
-0.0361          (0.0299) 
 
 
 
1.0997         (0.1594) 
 
-0.2098        (0.2053) 
 
 
 
0.9515          (0.0930) 
 
-0.2707**      (0.1192) 
R 2 Cost function 0.9965 0.9965 0.9966              0.9837         0.9886 
    R 2  Labor share equation 0.6635 0.6534 0.3611              0.7077         0.7088 
R 2  Material share equation 0.4951 0.4627 0.1999              0.5475         0.5540 
System log-likelihood                  488.315 484.456 416.001              375.643         380.607 
Goodness of fit c 0.9900 0.9908 0.9906              0.9598         0.9690 
LR test statistic - PBG vs. PB:  
LR = 7.72 
PBG vs. SQ:  
LR = 144.63 
PBG vs. GT: 
 LR = 225.34  
 
     PBG vs. ST:  
     LR = 215.42 
 
a Estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
b The values are computed for the average firm. The coefficient subscripts are U = urban, I = intercity, H = for-hire, L = labor, MS = materials. 
c The goodness-of-fit measure for the NLSUR systems is McElroy’s (1977) R   2. 
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Table 3. Estimates of economies of scope and scale for the PBG model by scaled values of the 
average outputs (at the average prices)a 
 SCALET  SCOPET SCOPEH SCOPEU SCOPEI SCOPEcHU  SCOPEcHI SCOPEcUI 
 Scaling 
procedure 
        
 = 0.25 1.1465*  
(0.0847) 
   0.2889** 
(0.1315) 
0.1312** 
(0.0648) 
0.1382** 
(0.0654) 
0.1581** 
(0.0671) 
0.1914** 
(0.0893) 
0.3081*** 
(0.1155) 
0.1633** 
(0.0674) 
 = 0.5 1.0328  
(0.0359) 
 0.1338* 
(0.0732) 
0.0389 
(0.0353) 
0.0537 
(0.0362) 
0.0957** 
(0.0411) 
0.0566 
(0.0518) 
0.1815** 
(0.0801) 
0.1010** 
(0.0416) 
 = 1   0.9173  
(0.0662) 
-0.0201 
(0.0792) 
-0.0409 
(0.0263) 
-0.0115 
(0.0232) 
0.0719** 
(0.0329) 
-0.0616 
(0.0389) 
0.1004* 
(0.0599) 
0.0788*** 
(0.0291) 
 = 2   0.8640***  
(0.0289) 
-0.0552 
(0.0405) 
-0.1312*** 
(0.0444) 
-0.0764** 
(0.0338) 
0.0788* 
(0.0461) 
-0.1816*** 
(0.0563) 
0.0561 
(0.0825) 
0.0936*** 
(0.0342) 
 = 4   0.7732***  
(0.0362) 
-0.1418 
(0.1148) 
-0.2484*** 
(0.0713) 
-0.1545*** 
(0.0548) 
0.1115 
(0.0750) 
-0.3086*** 
(0.0728) 
0.0369 
(0.1499) 
0.1554** 
(0.0613) 
a Estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Parameter  refers to the coefficient used to scale 
down ( = 0.25, 0.5) and up ( = 2, 4) the average values of the three outputs. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
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